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Too Easily Fooled? Prompt Injection Breaks LLMs on Frustratingly Simple Multiple-Choice Questions

Date
Publisher
arXiv
Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated strong emergent abilities in complex reasoning and zero-shot generalization, showing unprecedented potential for LLM-as-a-judge applications in education, peer review, and data quality evaluation. However, their robustness under prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions are embedded into the content to manipulate outputs, remains a significant concern. In this work, we explore a frustratingly simple yet effective attack setting to test whether LLMs can be easily misled. Specifically, we evaluate LLMs on basic arithmetic questions (e.g., "What is 3 + 2?") presented as either multiple-choice or true-false judgment problems within PDF files, where hidden prompts are injected into the file. Our results reveal that LLMs are indeed vulnerable to such hidden prompt injection attacks, even in these trivial scenarios, highlighting serious robustness risks for LLM-as-a-judge applications.
Study at a glance
  • Question: Can hidden textual instructions inside PDF files trick AI models into giving incorrect answers to simple questions?
  • Setting and data: Six AI models evaluated on four simple arithmetic multiple-choice and true-false judgment problems embedded in PDF files.
  • Method: Controlled experiment comparing model accuracy across three prompt conditions (no prompt, visible black-text prompt, and invisible white-text prompt) and defense prompting.
Why it matters

Prompt injection attacks threaten the reliability and fairness of using large language models as judges in education and grading. Little is known about whether subtle, visually hidden prompts in document files can manipulate model decisions.

Key findings
  • Visible black-text injection prompts successfully misled all tested models into choosing incorrect answers, even on trivial arithmetic questions.
  • Invisible white-text prompts embedded in PDFs misled GPT-4o into consistently following injected choices, whereas other models mostly ignored them.
  • Models with thinking modes (GPT-o3, Gemini-2.5 Pro, DeepSeek-R1) and defense prompts resisted invisible white-text injection attacks, though black prompts still caused varied vulnerabilities.

Summary drafted with AI from the full paper and may contain errors. See the full paper for details.

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